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Abstract
We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous
growth model with human capital and unproductive social capital. We show that with endogenous
discounting, growth outcome is history dependent and is function of initial endowment of human
capital. With low endowment, government intervention of any size is growth depressing. With high
endowment, government intervention is not associated with any depressing e¤ect. For intermediate
levels, there are multiple equilibria. Furthermore, countries with identical endowment and government
size can be in di¤erent equilibrium, and can have di¤erent growth rates within same equilibrium if
they di¤er in institutional quality.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between government size and economic growth has traditionally been a well debated
topic in economics. Empirical evidence is mixed as a higher government size is associated with accelerated
economic growth in some cases and retardation of growth in the case of others (Grossman, 1988; Bairam,
1990; Romero, Avila & Strauch, 2008; and Colombier, 2009). This, in fact, supports both the Pigovian
view of a benevolent government and the Public choice view of a distortive government. In the wake of
Grossman (1988), the literature is more focused on non-linear relationship between the two where the
positive e¤ect of government intervention is prevalent till its size does not exceed some threshold level.
Theoretically, the notion of optimal size of government is popularized by Barro (1990) and Armey (1995),
which illustrates an inverted U-shaped relationship between government size and economic growth. By
its implication, the role of government to correct market failures and to provide public goods is growth
enhancing since it is likely to encourage accumulation of productive capitals, whereas beyond a certain
threshold, further government intervention is growth depressing since it is likely to encourage unproductive
activities such as rent-seeking.
Building on the literature on rent seeking (Ehrlich & Lui 1999; Wadho 2014; and Krueger 1974), we
develop an endogenous growth model where the extent of government intervention (size of the government)
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a¤ects accumulation of both productive and unproductive capitals which in turn a¤ect the steady-state
as well as the rate of growth of the economy. We model discount factor1 as endogenous which depends
on the level of inherited human capital. We highlight a greater role of initial conditions (inherited human
capital) that not only directly, but also indirectly through preferences embedded in the discount factor,
a¤ect accumulation of capitals and hence the relationship between the size of government and economic
growth.
Literature on corruption and economic growth suggests that corruption is detrimental for growth
(Mauro, 1995; Goel & Nelson, 1998; and Ehrlich & Lui, 1999). The Public choice view of government
intervention posits that government intervention in market might be a third common factor a¤ecting
both corruption and economic growth at the same time. The idea is that government intervention creates
opportunities for private individuals, as well as for bureaucrats who work on behalf of the government,
to seek private benets at the expense of social welfare. In this case, along with a benevolent role of
government a¤ecting returns to a productive capital, it may also promote accumulation of an unpro-
ductive capital which is primarily meant to extract rents resulting from government intervention. This
generates an interplay between productive and unproductive facets of government leading to a non-linear
relationship between government intervention and economic growth. In this study, we focus on this inter-
play between productive human capital, which engenders growth, and unproductive social capital, which
assures a power to extract rents and has no benecial e¤ect on productivity.
Human capital and unproductive social capital not only di¤er in terms of their e¤ect on productivity,
these two forms of capital also di¤er in another important respect the time it takes to get returns.
Human capital is generally believed to be associated with delayed realisation of returns i.e. after certain
number of years one can get returns. In comparison to this, unproductive social capital (for rent seeking)
is generally associated with relatively immediate realisation. For example, having links with a tax o¢ cial
who can help in tax avoidance/evasion might not need a number of years of accumulation. When capitals
di¤er in this respect, returns to these capitals not only will depend on market factors and the extent
of government intervention, but will also depend on individuals time preference. Recent research on
the underinvestment in productive capitals such as human capital directs towards behavioral issues that
limit investment decisions by changing the decision making process (Mullainathan, 2005; and Duo,
2006). Becker and Mulligan (1997) suggest that interaction between time preferences and individual
characteristics such as education, wealth, and addictions etc. can partially explain this observation.
They argue that a lower rate of time preference enables individuals to discount distant utilities less;
making investment in future oriented capitals more attractive.
Incorporating the role of time preferences would necessitate a framework where discount rate is en-
dogenous, i.e. it is a function of individual characteristics. However, as noted by Anderson et al. (2004)
we have very little empirical information about the discount rate formation process. From existing liter-
ature, for Danish households, Harrison et al. (2002) show the presence of a large di¤erence between the
discount rates of skilled and unskilled individuals, with those who have skills having a signicantly lower
discount rate. Importantly, those with longer investments in education are also those with substantially
lower discount rates. This correlation between education and low discount rate is theoretically proposed
1Note that discount factor is the inverse of discount rate.
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by Becker and Mulligan (1997), and it is also highlighted by Bauer and Chytilova (2010) from Ugandan
villages, and by Kirby et al. (2002) from TsimaneAmerindians of the Bolivian rainforest. In growth
models, endogenous discount factor is modelled as a function of physical capital (Haaparanta & Puhakka,
2004), of level of consumption (Sarkar, 2007), of a generic theoretical construct of future-orientedcap-
ital (Stern, 2005), of average propensity to consume (Zee, 1997), and of own human capital (Bauer &
Chytilova, 2008).
In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model where individuals face a trade-o¤ between
investing in productive human capital with delayed realisation and unproductive social capital with im-
mediate returns in the presence of government intervention, and its impact on economic growth. Building
on the recent literature on endogenous discounting, we model a discount factor that is based on two
premises highlighted in the empirical literature; there is a positive correlation between education and low
discounting, and a positive correlation between parental education and low discounting. However, unlike
the Becker and Mulligan (1997) model where causality runs from education to lower discounting, we argue
that a higher discount factor a¤ects acquisition of education whereas education a¤ects discount factor
with one generational lag, i.e. the discount factor of current generation is a function of human capital it
inherited from the previous generation. For example, Perez-Arce (2011) using data on individuals seeking
admission in public colleges in Mexico shows that successful applicants were, on average, more patient
than those who were denied admission. Similarly, Kirby et al. (2002) nd that individual discount rate
decreases with parental (fathers) education. Bjorklund and Salvanes (2011, ch:3) indicate that agents
incentive to accumulate human capital is inuenced by the stock of her parental human capital. On
individualsrisk aversion, Hryshko et al. (2011) indicate that agents risk aversion is a¤ected in part by
parental education. Bisin and Verdier have written multiple papers on individual traits formation where
parents and societys role models play a central role (Bisin & Verdier 1998, 2000, 2001, 2005, and 2010).
This literature further highlights the presence of threshold e¤ects; Hryshko et al. (2011) observe that
parental education beyond grade 11 has a signicant impact on an agents risk aversion, Haveman, Wolfe
and Spaulding (1991) and Manski et al. (1992) show that parental completion of high school and one or
two years of post-secondary schooling are typically found to have a larger e¤ect on childrens schooling
when compared to other levels of parental education.
Our models settings have features in common with Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Wadho (2014) where
the former looks at the link between accumulation of human capital, political capital (a form of unproduc-
tive social capital), and economic growth in the presence of government in an economy that is populated
by two classes of agents, namely bureaucrats and workers. Bureaucrats indulge in rent-seeking by ap-
propriation as they appropriate away part of workers income by making use of their relative political
power. And the latter looks at the link between accumulation of human capital, political capital, and
economic growth in a setting with (a primitive) natural resource sector. Our setting di¤ers from theirs in
number of ways; rst and the most important is that we treat discount factor as endogenous. We model
discount factor as a positive function of individuals inherited human capital, and as we show that in
equilibrium human capital is a negative function of unproductive social capital, therefore discount factor
would also be negative function of previous generationstime investment in unproductive social capital.
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This has very important implications for steady-state growth regimes and growth rates as well. Contrary
to the conclusions arrived at by Ehrlich and Lui (1999) that a higher size of government is always growth
depressing; we do not establish a monotone relationship between government size and growth. In fact,
we nd that when inherited human capital is su¢ ciently large, government intervention is not growth
depressing, irrespective of its size. Furthermore, endogenous time preferences lead to history dependence
emphasizing the importance of investment decisions by previous generations in a¤ecting decisions of sub-
sequent generations. Same is modelled by Azariadis and Drazen (1990), but our settings di¤er from theirs
in two important ways. Most importantly, as we show that in our model the thresholds that demarcate
high-growth steady state and the low-growth steady state are endogenous and crucially depend on quality
of institutions. Furthermore, we base our model on recent empirical work where inherited capital a¤ects
discounting rather than the productivity of human capital technology.
Secondly, in Ehrlich and Lui (1999) settings, there is no public good provision by government which
implies that a higher government size always increases the incentive for rent-seeking by appropriation,
whereas we model a redistributive government with imperfect administrative controls and institutional
checks which creates a trade-o¤ for rent-seekers that generates non-monotone relationship between the
size of government and rent-seeking2 . Thirdly, we model rent-seeking in two di¤erent forms, i.e. agents
can seek rents by evasionas well as by appropriation. Introduction of rent-seeking by evasion along
with rent-seeking by appropriation creates a new trade-o¤ for rent-seekers as a higher extent of evasion
implies that a smaller pool of government revenue would be available for appropriation3 .
Since rent-seeking is illegal and rent-seekers run the risk of getting caught, another element that a¤ects
individual incentives to invest in these two di¤erent forms of capital is the quality of institutions. We
model two di¤erent forms of rent seeking in this economy. Firstly, government intervention in the economy
creates an incentive for agents to spend their time in building unproductive social capital which enables
them to reduce the fraction of their income taken away by the government rent-seeking by evasion.
Thus the quality of ex-ante administrative controls, that constrain rent-seeking by evasion, plays a very
important role. Secondly, agents have an incentive to invest time in building up unproductive social
capital since with the help of it, they can appropriate away part of receipts resulting from government
intervention rent-seeking by appropriation. Hence the ex-post institutional controls that detect and
punish rent-seekers play an important role in constraining such rent-seeking. In line with the concept of
institutions in Acemoglu et al. (2003), quality of institutions implies how strong/weak the constraints
on rent seeking are. We show that returns to rent seeking (and so the human capital) and steady-state
level of growth crucially depend on both ex-ante and ex-post institutional controls.
In line with the empirical ndings, we show that there is a non-monotone relationship between the
size of government and economic growth. When discounting is endogenous and a¤ected by inherited
human capital, the growth outcome is history dependent. We suggest that with lower levels of inherited
human capital, government intervention of any size is growth depressing as it promotes the accumulation
of unproductive capital. And when levels of inherited human capital are large enough, government
2Wadho (2014) models redistributive government but the share that corrupt elite gets through appropriation is always
greater than the share he could have from government redistribution.
3Both Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Wadho (2014) model rent-seeking by appropriation only.
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intervention of any size is not associated with the accumulation of unproductive capital and there is high
growth. Whereas for the intermediate levels of inherited human capital, whether government intervention
is growth depressing or not depends on the size of intervention and the level of inherited human capital.
In this scenario, bigger government size is growth depressing and higher levels of inherited human capital
dilute this e¤ect by promoting investment in productive human capital. Thus countries with identical
levels of inherited human capital and government size can be in di¤erent equilibrium regimes if they
di¤er in quality of institutions. In all our sub-specications, better institutions imply that lower inherited
human capital is needed to be in the high growth equilibrium.
2 Description of the Economy
2.1 Households
There are overlapping generations of two period lived agents with agents being young in period 1 and
old in period 2. There is no population growth and each generation is of size n. Every agent acts as
both a producer and a consumer in each period and agents within each generation are identical. Every
agent has a unitary time endowment in each period, which when young she allocates among receiving
education, working in the unskilled sector, and accumulating unproductive social capital; and when old
she spends the entire time working in the skilled sector.
All agents from each generation have identical preferences given by the log utility function of form:
Ut = ln(c1t) + t ln(c2t) (1)
where c1t and c2t denote consumption in period 1 and 2, respectively, by a representative agent of
generation t. t > 0 is the generation-specic discount factor
4 . As we explain in subsequent sections, it
depends on the average level of initial/inherited human capital of the generation.
3 Technologies
There are four production technologies involving the production of i) human capital, ii) unproductive
social capital, iii) nal good by the unskilled sector, and iv) nal good by the skilled sector. Accumulation
of human capital (knowledge) is the driver of growth in this model. Acquisition of knowledge in the rst
period enables agents to produce more output in the second period and hence earn more in the latter part
of their life. Unproductive social capital on the other hand, enables them to make use of social networks,
links and contacts to: i) evade government intervention, and ii) appropriate away the rents that are created
as a result of government intervention. Since social capital does not facilitate production, either directly
or indirectly, and since it facilitates rent-seeking, we call it unproductive. These two capitals markedly
di¤er with respect to the timing of realisation of returns. Human capital, which involves investment in
early period of life, yields returns only in the latter part of life. Whereas returns from unproductive social
4t is not bounded from above. For further discussion and justication, please refer to Section 7 Patience thresholds
and equilibria
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capital are immediately realised. Every agent is endowed with one unit of time in every time period.
In the rst period, it involves three competing uses of this time, i.e. accumulation of human capital,
accumulation of unproductive social capital, and working. Let hit and qit be the time spent by agent i
of generation t in the accumulation of human capital and unproductive social capital, respectively, then
(1  hit   qit) is the time spent working in the unskilled sector. In the second period, each agent spends
her entire time working in the skilled sector.
3.1 Human Capital
We envisage human capital accumulation technology similar to Lucas (1988), Ehrlich and Lui (1999),
and Wadho (2014). Human capital is generated by:
Hi2t = AHi1thit (2)
whereHi1t denotes the inherited human capital by agent i of generation t. It is equivalent to her ancestors
second period stock of human capital, Hi2t 1. hit denotes time invested by agent i in the accumulation
of human capital, and A > 1, which represents the productivity of human capital production technology.
3.2 Unproductive Social Capital
Investing time in building up social networks, links, and contacts enables individuals to achieve two
ends, i.e. i) to escape from government intervention, and ii) to appropriate part of the rents created
in the economy due to government intervention. Although it might be tempting to think that the sort
of social networks and contacts modelled here are those specically involving government o¢ cials and
bureaucrats as is the case, for instance, in Ehrlich and Lui (1999). We envisage a rather broader context
where apart from government o¢ cials, private agents can also develop these links to achieve the same
ends of escaping government intervention and appropriating away government revenue. These links can
take various forms, for instance, media and journalistic organisations, religious groups, political parties,
and other such organised groups and collective bargaining organisations which can inuence government
a¤airs by means of consent, manipulation, force, and coercion.
The concept of unproductive social capital is similar to the concept of rent-seeking in Krueger (1974).
By indulging in this particular form of social networking, an agent: i) spends less time working for the
production of the nal good in period 1, and also ii) spends less time receiving education when young,
and therefore as a result, produces less of the nal good in the second period due to smaller second period
skill set.
Unproductive social capital for rent-seeking di¤ers from human capital in one important respect that
unlike human capital, which is realised in the second time period, social capital is accumulated and realised
in the same time period. The reason for formation of social capital in the period of investment is that
developing acquaintances5 and building links is a relatively quick process when compared to acquiring
education, which, at best, takes more than a decade to reach a particular level of attainment (i.e. high
5Such friendships are purely transactional in nature in which individuals develop contacts only for the purpose of
extracting certain benets, exhibiting opportunist behaviour.
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school, undergraduate, graduate, post-graduate, etc.). Secondly, rewards to human capital accumulation
are realised only in the latter half of life, whereas the returns to unproductive social capital accumulation
are realised instantaneously.
The production technology of unproductive social capital is symmetric to that of human capital.
Every young agent can access social networks developed by her parent and can build on these contacts
and links by taking away time from production and education. The production function for unproductive
social capital is as follows:
Qi2t = Qi1t = BQi0tqit (3)
where Qi0t denotes the inherited stock of unproductive social capital of agent i of generation t, qit
denotes her time investment in the accumulation of unproductive social capital, B > 1 is the productivity
parameter. Since returns to this capital are realised in the period of investment, therefore, Qi1t denotes
the rst period stock of unproductive social capital. Agents may accumulate this capital only once in
their lifetime, therefore, in the absence of depreciation, the second period stock of this capital, Qi2t, will
remain at its rst period level6 .
3.3 Final Goods Production
The nal good is produced using two di¤erent technologies. Every agent works as an entrepreneur in both
unskilled and skilled sectors using her own labour to produce the nal good. A one-for-one relationship
is assumed between hours worked by an unskilled agent and the amount of nal good she produces.
3.3.1 Unskilled sector
Output produced by the unskilled sector is given by:
Y ut =
nX
i=1
yuit =
nX
i=1
(1  hit   qit) (4)
where Y ut denotes the aggregate output of the unskilled sector produced by agents from generation t.
It is sum of the output produced by each of the n young agents working in the unskilled sector, where
output produced by the ith agent is given by yuit.
3.3.2 Skilled Sector
Output produced by the skilled sector is given by:
Y st =
nX
i=1
ysit =
nX
i=1
Hi2t (5)
where Y st denotes aggregate output of the skilled sector produced by agents belonging to generation t.
It is sum of the output produced by each of the n old agents working in the skilled sector, where output
produced by the ith agent is given by ysit. Where  > 1 denotes the productivity of the skilled sector and
6This setting will remain the same if we allow social capital to depreciate and assume that new investment in it is equal
to depreciated capital, i.e. break-even investment.
7
Hi2t is the e¤ective labour supplied by the ith agent in period 2. Since  is greater than unity, the wage
(per unit of e¤ective labour) paid by the skilled sector is strictly greater than the unitary wage paid by
the unskilled sector.
Total output of the economy at time  is thus the sum of aggregate skilled sector output produced
by old agents and aggregate unskilled sector output produced by young agents living at time  .
Y = Y
s
;t 1 + Y
u
;t
4 Government Intervention and Rent-seeking
We model government along the lines of Ehrlich and Lui (1999) as all transactions in the economy are
subject to government intervention, or alternatively, government takes away a certain fraction,  of agents
income in each period. It then redistributes all receipts from intervention as a public consumption good7
and runs a balanced budget. Receipts from each sector are distributed equally among the agents working
in that particular sector8 .
In the absence of rent-seeking, government revenue at time  from its intervention in the skilled sector
results in total receipts of Y s . Assuming that old agents from generation t  1 work in the skilled sector
at time  , this then becomes Y st 1. Similarly, government revenue at time  from its intervention in the
unskilled sector is Y u . It is equivalent to Y
u
t since young agents from generation t work in the unskilled
sector at time  . The total government revenue at time  , in the absence of rent-seeking, thus becomes:
Y = 
 
Y s;t 1 + Y
u
;t

= Y s;t 1 + Y
u
;t
where 0    1. Since government redistributes receipts collected from each sector equally among all
agents working in that sector, the total amount of public consumption good provided by the government
thus becomes:
R = n

Y s;t 1
n

+ n

Y u;t
n

= Y s;t 1 + Y
u
;t = G
It is important to note that in the absence of rent-seeking, the presence of a redistributivegovernment
does not a¤ect incentives and optimal allocations of agents. The reason being that agents within each
generation are homogenous coupled with governments policy of sector-specic redistribution ensures that
agents receive the same fraction of their income as public consumption good that is initially taken away
by government. Therefore government intervention and subsequent redistribution along these lines leaves
agentspayo¤s una¤ected.
We model rent-seeking in two di¤erent forms, i.e. rent-seeking by evasion and rent-seeking by
7We abstain from the use of term taxation in our discourse throughout and instead rely on much broader notion of
government intervention. This distinction is necessitated by the fact that we have modelled government intervention in a
way that seems remarkably similar to the treatment of taxes in most theoretic economic models. However, in this model, the
role of government is neither that of facilitating nal goods production, a là Barro (1990) nor is that of ensuring provision
of education, as modelled by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992). It is equivalent to assuming that the government takes away
some fraction of agentsincome in order to provide them with a public consumption good which is produced on a one-for-one
basis using receipts from government intervention as the only input.
8Two di¤erent generations work in the unskilled and the skilled sector at any time  . We assume that the government
does not carry-out intergenerational redistribution of income.
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appropriation. We assume that an agent who opts to indulge in rent-seeking would commit to both forms
of rent-seeking activities. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that despite there being redistribution by
the government, agents still may prefer appropriation over it in the hope of commanding a greater share
of government revenue than they would if they remain honest. This will particularly be true if agents
fear dishonesty on part of their peers, which may result in them being deprived of their due share of
government redistribution, and hence leading to the particular form of coordination failureexhibited in
this setting.
Rent-seeking is illegal and rent-seekers run the risk of getting caught. Every rent-seeker faces a
probability, z, of being caught. When caught, her entire second period earnings are conscated by the
government9 . z reects the quality of institutions, where better institutions (higher z) would imply
stronger constraints on rent-seeking. These law enforcement institutions reect the ex-postinstitutional
constraints which may take the form of policing and legislative organs of the state which spring into
action after the illegal/criminal activity of rent-seeking is carried out. For simplicity, we assume that the
conscated earnings of rent-seekers are not subject to redistribution (and therefore to appropriation), i.e.
these are dissipated.
4.1 Rent-seeking by evasion
When an agent opts for evasion, she may be able to escape government intervention, either partly, or
completely, depending on three di¤erent factors; the relative strength of her unproductive social capital,
the strength of administrative controls put in place by government, represented by , and the proportion
of dishonest agents in the society, dt. These administrative controls by the government are a form of
ex-anteinstitutional constraints.  in the present context may refer to the competence of civil servants,
their independence from being swayed by pressure groups, lobbies, and political parties10 . Therefore 
acts as a deterrent to rent-seeking beforean agent indulges in such an activity.
The fraction of income that is subject to government intervention varies from one agent to another
and this is true for agents working in the skilled as well as the unskilled sector. The expression for the
extent of government intervention, which an ith agents income will be subject to is given by:
it =
 if qit = 0


1  dt

Qit
 
Qt
  

if qit > 0

(6)
where  = 1; 2 and 0    1; and 0  dt  1 is the proportion of dishonest agents in the economy.
Equation (6) implies that if an agent opts to be honest (i.e. qit = 0) then the fraction of her income that
will be subject to government intervention is equal to the size of government. However, if she opts to
9The reason why the entire second period income may be taken away from a rent-seeker is that the government may
impose a ne or a penalty as large as agents entire second period income to deter agents from rent-seeking. Also, when
caught, an agent may be imprisoned for a considerable amount of time, disabling her from work. Furthermore, once an
agent is identied as a rent-seeker, then she may lose her job not to be employed any further.
10 It may also refer to the credibility of the governments commitment to policies. In our case  is the policy variable
which entails the government taking away a pre-dened proportion of agentsincome for the purpose of provision of public
consumption good.  in this case can be interpreted as a measure of credibility of governments commitment to its policy
since a higher  would imply higher administrative controls by the government preventing leakages in the form of rent-
seeking and therefore keeping governments credibility in tact to provide the public consumption good in return for its
receipts from market intervention (see Glaeser et al., 2004).
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invest in unproductive social capital for rent-seeking (i.e. qit > 0), and uses her social capital to evade
government intervention, then, the fraction of her income subject to government intervention will vary.
She will be successful in preventing the government from taking away some part of the fraction  of her
income if the relative strength of her social capital to that of the average of agents from her generation
i.e.Qit 
Qt

is greater than the strength of governments administrative controls (i.e. ). However, if the
converse is true, then she may relinquish a higher fraction of her income than she would have in the case
of being honest. This indicates that if government administrative controls are adequate enough, then
this particular form of rent-seeking can be discouraged since the government will punish rent-seekers by
taking away a larger fraction of their income than .11 Furthermore, the e¤ect of either of these cases is
accentuated by the proportion of dishonest agents in the economy. An agent with relatively strong social
networks (strong enough to render government administrative controls ine¤ective) will be beneted by
the strategic complementarity stemming from dt. However, if her social networks are not strong enough,
then a higher proportion of dishonest agents in the economy will be detrimental for her, and the fraction
of her income subject to government intervention will increase. Thus, the relative socialstanding of an
agent amidst her peers and the strength of government administrative controls mutually determine, as
to whether or not rent-seeking by an agent will be protable.
4.2 Rent-seeking by appropriation
Rent-seeking by appropriation takes place when agents use their unproductive social capital to appropriate
away part of receipts accrued due to government intervention. The size of share that rent-seekers can
appropriate depends on two factors.
Firstly, it depends on the total fraction of government revenue which is subject to appropriation. This
fraction varies with the proportion of rent-seekers in the economy, dt and the strength of government
administrative controls, . The expression for total pool of government revenue which is subject to
appropriation is as follows:
Pt = dtmt = dt [1   (1  dt)] (7)
where 0  Pt  1. Equation (7) implies that the fraction of government receipts that can be appropriated
positively depends on the proportion of rent-seekers, dt. Firstly, there is a direct positive e¤ect as an
economy with higher proportion of rent-seekers would be subject to bigger appropriation. The second
e¤ect is indirect, coming through mt, which is in line with the literature on the theory of deterrence
suggesting that when the proportion of dishonest individuals is high, it makes administrative controls
less e¤ective. Lui (1986) reports that a fundamental observation on corruption is that it becomes very
di¢ cult to audit e¤ectively if many are corrupt.
We also model another complementarity among the rent-seekers which arises from the way appropri-
ated receipts are shared. Similar to Tullock (1980)12 , the share it that an individual gets depends on
11 It seems plausible as when agents are caught, they will not only be asked to pay equal to what they were legally
supposed to, but some penalty on top of that as well.
12This sharing technology is also incorporated by Wadho (2014).
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her relative power, specically:
it =
Qit
nP
j=1
Qjt
(8)
where  = 1; 2. Equation (8) implies that the share that an individual gets increases with her investment
in unproductive social capital and decreases with the aggregate unproductive social capital as bigger
aggregate capital would imply a smaller relative capital of an individual.
5 AgentsIncome and Consumption
In each period, an individuals income comprises of three components; the wage income, the share of
consumption subsidy received from the government, and the share of appropriated receipts received. We
assume that income of each period is entirely consumed in that period. The expression for the lifetime
income of, and henceforth consumption by agents is as follows:
cit = ci1t + ci2t = (1  i1t)yuit + (1  Pt)
nP
j=1
j1ty
u
jt
n
+ itPti1t
nX
j=1
j1ty
u
jt +
(1  itz)
2664(1  i2t)ysit + (1  Pt)
nP
j=1
j2ty
s
jt
n
+ itPti2t
nX
j=1
j2ty
s
jt
3775 (9)
where it = 0 if qit = 0 and it = 1 if qit > 0, y
u
it and y
s
it represent an agents period 1 and period 2
income, respectively. i1t and i2t, respectively, are the fraction of an agents period 1 and period 2 income
subject to government intervention, Pt is the fraction of government revenue subject to appropriation,
i1t is the share of appropriated rents that ith agent will receive if she opts to be a rent-seeker. The term
(1  itz) represents the probability of a rent-seeker escaping accountability. We assume that if an agent
is caught seeking rent then her entire second period income is conscated.
6 AgentsDecision Problem
We have a two-dimensional problem; rst an individual decides to be a rent-seeker or remains honest
depending on the behavior of others, second, how much time to be allocated to each activity (when she
is young), i.e. human capital accumulation, unproductive social capital accumulation, and working.
The solution to agentsdecision problem is obtained through backwards induction. We rst determine
agentsoptimal time allocation in scenarios when all are honest and when all of them are rent-seekers. We
nd agentsoptimal time allocation between acquiring education, ht, in the accumulation of unproductive
social capital, qt, and working, (1  ht   qt).
The second stage involves individual decision to be a rent-seeker or not depending on the utility
comparison under two di¤erent scenarios when others do not invest in unproductive social capital, qit = 0,
and when others invest in unproductive social capital, qit > 0.
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6.1 High Growth (qit = 0) Equilibrium
To begin with, we nd the optimal time allocation by agents between acquiring education and working in
the unskilled sector in period 1, assuming that all of them have opted to remain honest, i.e. dt = 0. We
call this the high growth equilibriumsince none of the agents is indulging in the unproductive activity
of rent-seeking, implying that it = 0, qit = 0 8 i. In addition to that, the government takes away a
fraction  of each agents income. The fraction of government revenue available for provision of public
consumption good , 1  Pt, becomes 1  Pt = 1.
The individualsmaximization problem is:
max
ci1t, ci2t, hit
Uit = ln(ci1t) + t ln(ci2t)
subject to:
ci1t = (1  )yuit +
nP
j=1
j1ty
u
jt
n
ci2t = (1  )ysit +
nP
j=1
j2ty
s
jt
n
yuit = (1  hit)
ysit = Hi2t
Hi2t = AHi1thit
0  hit  1
where each agent takes the total unskilled(skilled) sector output when young(old) and therefore the total
amount of public consumption good to be provided by the government in both periods as given. The
rst-order condition of this maximization problem for hit is:
ci2t
ci1t
= tAHi1t
Using the expressions for ci1t and ci2t and by using the condition that all agents are homogeneous in
equilibrium (implying that hit = ht, Hi2t = H2t) , time investment in human capital is:
hHGt =
t
1 + t
(10)
Using equation (2), it can be observed that in a high growth equilibrium, the growth rate of human
capital, and therefore of output is:
1 + gHGt =
tA
1 + t
The rate of growth in high growth case depends on the productivity of education technology and
the discount factor (patience), t. This is in line with Lucas (1988) where productivity of education
technology and patience positively a¤ect economic growth. As we will see in subsequent sections that
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t is endogenous and it depends on the educational investment of the previous generation, the level of
human capital, therefore the rate of growth is going to be history dependent as in Azariadis and Drazen
(1990). Although here it is t that is endogenous as compared to theirs where A was endogenous.
6.2 Low Growth (qit > 0) Equilibrium
Now, consider the case when all agents opt to be rent-seekers, i.e. dt = 1. This implies that it = 1 and
qit > 0 8 i. The fraction of government revenue subject to appropriation, as given by equation (7), thus
becomes Pt = 1 [1   (1  1)] = 1.
This implies that the entire government revenue is going to be appropriated and therefore there is no
provision of public consumption good.
The individualsmaximization problem is:
max
ci1t, ci2t, hit, qit
Uit = ln(ci1t) + t ln(ci2t)
subject to:
ci1t = (1  i1t)yuit + i1t
nX
j=1
j1ty
u
jt
ci2t = (1  z)
24(1  i2t)ysit + i2t nX
j=1
j2ty
s
jt
35
yuit = (1  hit   qit)
ysit = Hi2t
Hi2t = AHi1thit
Qit = Qi2t = Qi1t = BQi0tqit
it = i2t = i1t = 
241 
0@Qi1t
 
Q1t
  
1A35
it = i2t = i1t =
Qi1t
nP
i=1
Qi1t
0  hit  1
0  qit  1
where each agent takes the total unskilled(skilled) sector output when young(old) and therefore the total
amount of public consumption good to be provided by the government in both periods, and the levels of
aggregate and average social capital of the society in both periods as given. The rst-order conditions of
this maximization problem for hit and qit, respectively, are as follows:
hit =
t
1 + t
2664(1  qit) +
Pn
j=1 jt (1  hjt   qjt)
1  it
0BB@ QitnP
i=1
Qit
1CCA
3775  11 + t
Pn
j=1 jtHj1thjt
(1  it)Hi1t
0BB@ QitnP
i=1
Qit
1CCA
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qit = t(1  z)
ci1t
ci2t
2664Hi2t +
 
Qt

nP
i=1
Qit
nX
j=1
jty
s
jt
3775+ (1  hit) +
 
Qt

nP
i=1
Qit
nX
j=1
jty
u
jt  
 
Qt
BQi0t
(1  it)
From the rst-order condition for hit given above, the time investment in human capital is a negative
function of time investment in unproductive social capital, highlighting the trade-o¤ that more time
invested in unproductive social capital reduces the investment in human capital. Thus, an agents decision
to indulge in rent-seeking reduces her incentive to accumulate human capital by lowering her returns to
acquisition of education.
By using rst-order conditions and expressions for ci1t,ci2t, it and equilibrium conditions (implying
that hit = ht, qit = qt, Hi2t = H2t, Qi1t = Q1t, and so forth), we obtain:
qLGt =
(1 + )
1 + 
(11)
hLGt =
t
1 + t

1  
1 + 

(12)
As was the case without rent-seeking, investment in human capital increases with the discount factor.
Whereas investment in unproductive social capital does not depend on the discount factor because returns
to it are realised in the same time period. Since bigger size of the government implies a bigger amount
of receipts and hence greater appropriation, the investment in unproductive social capital increases with
the size of government. Our rst-order conditions show that investment in human capital decreases with
investment in unproductive social capital. Thus the size of government indirectly depresses investment
in human capital by promoting investment in unproductive social capital.
Ex-ante institutional controls, , increase investment in unproductive social capital resulting in de-
pressing investment in human capital.  a¤ects incentives to invest in unproductive social capital through
two di¤erent channels with opposing e¤ects. It reduces returns to rent-seeking by evasion whereas it in-
crease returns to rent-seeking by appropriation as it increases the amount of appropriable receipts. In
this case with dt = 1 the latter e¤ect is dominant over the former. Furthermore, since  < 1, equation
(11) implies that qLGt < 1 and there is no corner solution where individuals invest their entire time in
accumulating unproductive social capital.
Using equation (3), it can be observed that in the low growth equilibrium, the growth rate of human
capital and therefore of output will be:
1 + gLGt =
tA
1 + t

1  
1 + 

First observation is that since 1 1+ < 1 =) gLGt < gHGt , higher level of patience (higher t) and higher
productivity of education technology, A, create an incentive for agents to accumulate the future oriented
human capital and it therefore results in an increase in the rate of economic growth. However, in the
presence of rent-seeking, growth rate decreases with the size of government. Interestingly, a higher size of
government coupled with better ex-ante institutional controls increases the pool of receipts that can be
appropriated thus increasing incentives to invest in unproductive social capital and depressing investment
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in human capital and the rate of growth.
6.3 Agentsdecision to seek rents
In the previous section, we solved for agentsoptimal time allocation decision between human capital,
unproductive social capital, and working. In this section, we use the backward induction approach, and
by using agents optimal choices from the previous section, determine whether or not she becomes a
rent-seeker. In doing so, we compare the utility of an agent when she acts like the rest of her peers in
either of the two cases discussed above with the case when her optimal choices di¤er from that of the rest
of her peers. Given the equilibria in the previous section, there are two possible scenarios depending on
whether others invest time qt = 0 or qt > 0 in the accumulation of unproductive social capital. Moreover,
since rents are generated due to government intervention, an individuals decision to be a rent-seeker
would crucially depend on the extent of government intervention in the economy, . For further analysis,
we assume that the size of population of each generation is large enough implying that 1n  0.
6.3.1 When all others opt to remain honest (i.e. qt = 0 and ht = hHG)
When all others are honest and individual i also opts to be honest, then qit = 0 and hit = hHG. The
utility of the ith agent when she opts to remain honest is given by:
Uhiht = ln(1  hHGt ) + t ln(AH1thHGt ) (13)
Throughout the rest of this paper, we use a sub-script to represent the behavior of an individual agent
and a super-script to represent the behavior of others. We use (r) for rent-seeking and (h) is used to
denote honest behavior. When all others are honest and individual i opts to be a rent-seeker then since
she is the only one to be a rent-seeker, our diversion technology implies that dt = 1nand Pt =
n (1 )
n .
The rst-order conditions yield the following optimal values of time-investment in human and unpro-
ductive social capital, respectively:
hhrt =
t
1 + t

1   (1  )
1 + 

(14)
qhrt =
(2  )
1 + 
(15)
The utility of the ith agent who is a rent-seeker while all others are honest is therefore given by:
Uhirt = ln
 
1  hhrt   qhrt

+ (2  )(1  hHG)+ t ln (1  z)  AH1thhrt + (2  )AH1thHGt  (16)
By comparing her utilities in equation (13) and equation (16), the individual decides whether to be a
rent-seeker or not.
Proposition 1 8 
 
, there exists a high growth equilibrium such that no one is a rent-seeker.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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When the extent of government intervention in the economy is
 
 or lower, then returns to rent-seeking
are small enough that it does not pay individuals to be rent-seekers and to invest in unproductive social
capital. As a result, when  
 
 , the economy is in a high-growth equilibrium which is characterized by
no rent-seeking and a higher stock of equilibrium human capital, where:
 
 =
1  +
q
(1  )2 + 4(2  )(1  )
2(2  ) (17)
where  = (1  z)
t
1+t
Whereas, when  >
 
 , then it always pays to become a rent-seeker, irrespective of whether others are
honest or not. The threshold level of government intervention that determines high-growth equilibrium,
 
 , is endogenous and it depends on discount factor (patience), t, and strength of government ex-ante
(), and ex-post (z) institutional controls. This implies that the extent of government intervention
compatible with high growth depends on patience embedded in discount factor (t) and the institutional
quality represented by  and z. Comparative statics can be obtained by di¤erentiating the threshold
 

with t, z, and . Interestingly,
@
 

@t
, @
 

@z , and
@
 

@ are all positive
13 . It is also interesting to note that
when there are no ex-post constraints, i.e. z = 0, then
 
 = 0 and high growth equilibrium does not exist.
This is very intuitive as with bad institutions, such that there is no cost of rent-seeking, returns of being
a rent-seeker would always exceed returns of being honest. And in the other extreme when the agent is
certain of being caught in the second period, the quality of ex-post institutions is good, i.e. z = 1, then
 
 =1 and high-growth equilibrium exists for all values of
 
 .
6.3.2 When all others opt to seek rent (i.e. qt = qLG and ht = hLG)
The utility of an agent when she opts to be a rent-seeker when all others are also rent-seekers is given by:
Urirt = ln(1  hLGt   qLGt ) + t ln((1  z)AH1thLGt ) (18)
When all others are corrupt and individual i decides to deviate and stay honest, in this case a share
dt =
n 1
n is appropriated by other corrupt members. Individual i will invest hit = h
HG = t1+t
and her
utility is:
Uriht = ln((1  )(1  hHGt )) + t ln((1  )AH1thHGt ) (19)
8   , there exists a low growth equilibrium such that everyone is a rent-seeker.
Proof. See Appendix B.
When the extent of government intervention is greater than or equal to the threshold of  , then
irrespective of the probability of detection (quality of institutions) and whether other members are rent-
seekers or not, it will always pay to be a rent-seeker. Thus, when     then the economy is in a
13For proof, see Appendix A.
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low-growth equilibrium in which everyone is a rent-seeker and where:
  =
+
q
()
2
+ 4(1  )
2
(20)
recall that  = (1  z)
t
1+t
Whereas when  <  , then it always pays an agent to remain honest. Since there is a cost of
losing second period income if detected, when the extent of government intervention is less than  ,
pay-o¤ from rent-seeking is not su¢ cient to o¤set expected costs and in such a situation agents remain
honest. Therefore, the low-growth equilibrium does not exist when the size of government is below  .
Moreover, the threshold   is endogenous and it depends on discount factor (patience), t, and strength
of government ex-ante (), and ex-post (z) institutional controls. Partial derivatives,
@
 
@t
,
@
 
@ , and
@
 
@z ,
all are positive14 . This implies that the range of government intervention where low growth equilibrium
exists decreases with patience that allows less discounting of returns to human capital, and with both
ex-ante and ex-post institutional constraints that make rent-seeking less protable. Interestingly, when
z = 0 (no ex-post institutional controls), then   =  and low growth equilibrium exists for   .
Intuitively, in the case when there is no ex-post cost of rent-seeking, then rent-seeking is protable only if
extent of government intervention is large enough to cover the ex-ante cost of rent-seeking, . Range of
the extent of government intervention where there is low-growth equilibrium decreases with the quality
of ex-post institutional constraints, and in a extreme case when z = 1, low-growth equilibrium does not
exist even when the entire economy is run by the government, i.e.  = 1.
7 Patience thresholds and equilibria
In the pervious section, we demonstrated that the steady-state levels of growth are inuenced by the extent
of government intervention. More importantly, the thresholds of size of government which demarcate
high and low growth steady-states are endogenous and crucially depend on the extent of individuals
discounting of the future. Both thresholds (
 
 and  ) are positive functions of the discount factor, t, which
generates the most important result of our model that the relationship between the size of government
and growth is non-monotone. This implies that two countries with identical size of government can
be in di¤erent equilibria if they di¤er in discounting. A more patient society can be in a high-growth
equilibrium even with a larger extent of government intervention. In this section we go one step ahead
and model the discount factor, t, as endogenous. Anderson et al. (2004) noted that we have very little
empirical evidence when it comes to the discount rate formation. We model discount rate based on two
premises highlighted by the recent research. Firstly, there is a positive correlation between education and
discount factor (patience). Secondly, discounting is a¤ected by parents and their education (Kirby et al.,
2002; Bjorklund & Salvanes, 2011).
The level of patience of agents belonging to generation t is a function of their average initial stock of
14For proof, see Appendix B.
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human capital, H1t, as follows:
t = 
0BB@
nP
i=1
Hi1t
n
1CCA =  (H1t) = max 0  , 0H1t

(21)
where t = 0H

1t for any H1t > 0, t = 0 
when H1t = 0 and 0    115 .
Before proceeding further, for the rest of the paper we assume that  cannot be equal to 0 or 1,
specically, "    ! where "! 0 and ! ! 1.
Proposition 2 8H1t 
=
H =) t 
=
, there is a unique high growth equilibrium8   ! ! 1. 8H1t
 H
=
=) t  
=
, there is a unique low growth equilibrium 8   " ! 0. And 8H
=
< H1t <
=
H there are
multiple equilibria
Proof. See Appendix C.
where:
H
=
=
0@ ln

1+"+(2 )"2
1+"

0 ln
h
1+"
(1 z)[1+"+(2 )"2]
i
1A
1

=
H =
0@ ln

1 !
1 !2

0 ln
h
1 !2
(1 z)(1 !)
i
1A
1

(22)
Results in Proposition 3 reinforce the role of history dependence of steady-states on human capital
proposed in the seminal paper by Azariadis and Drazen (1990). Our results though di¤er from theirs
in two important respects. First, thresholds in their paper are exogenous, whereas we model thresholds
as endogenous, and crucially, these depend on the quality of institutions. Second, in our setting, rather
than a¤ecting the productivity of human capital technology, inherited human capital a¤ects the discount
factor, which makes investment in productive human capital with delayed realisation more valuable. This
is in line with threshold e¤ects highlighted by the recent literature, for instance, Haveman, Wolfe and
Spaulding (1991) and Manski et al. (1992) show that parental completion of high school and one or two
years of post-secondary schooling typically have a larger e¤ect on childrens schooling when compared to
other levels of parental education. Hryshko et al. (2011) nd that individualsrisk aversion is a¤ected
by their parentseducation and by the society. They nd that parental education beyond grade 11 has a
signicant impact on an individuals risk aversion, indicating that risk aversion exhibits threshold e¤ects
in levels of parental education. Moreover, Dohmen et al. (2010) nd that there is a signicant and a
robust relationship between individualsrisk aversion and impatience.
Our results indicate that societies with high inherited human capital are considerably patient and
discount future less, which results in high investment in human capital by the current generation, irre-
spective of the size of the government. We also show that societies with low inherited human capital are
considerably impatient and discount future more, resulting in low investment by the current generation
15As opposed to common convention in economic models, we do not bound t by the upper limit of unity. As proposed
by Becker and Mulligan (1997) and by the catching up with the Joneseshypothesis, t can be greater than one.
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in human capital, regardless of government size. For intermediate ranges of inherited human capital, we
show that both high and low growth equilibrium exist. Thresholds
=
H and H
=
are endogenous and are
a¤ected by policy variables  (ex-ante institutional controls) and z (ex-post institutional controls). Both
are reduced by an increase in  as well as by an increase in z16 . This implies that when we compare
a country which has better quality institutions (high  and z) with a country which has low quality
institutions (low  and z), the former will be in the high-growth steady-state equilibrium with relatively
smaller inherited human capital as compared to the latter.
For intermediate levels of inherited human capital there are multiple equilibria. Specically, we show
that when inherited human capital is greater than the lower boundH
=
but less thanH  =

ln

1 "
1 "2

0 ln
h
1 "2
(1 z)[1 "]
i 1 ,
then there are two equilibrium regimes depending on the extent of government intervention, . For bigger
size of the government, specically when  >
 
 , there is a unique low-growth equilibrium, whereas for
 
 
 both high-growth and low-growth equilibrium coexist.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Similarly, when inherited human capital is less than the upper bound
=
H, but is greater than
 
H =0@ ln 1+!+(2 )!21+! 
0 ln

1+!
(1 z)[1+!+(2 )!2]

1A 1 , then there are two growth regimes depending on the size of the government.
Specically, when  <  , there is a unique high-growth equilibrium, whereas for all    , both high-
growth and low-growth equilibrium coexist.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
In the intermediate range when inherited human capital is in betweenH  and
 
H, there are three growth
regimes. There is a unique high-growth equilibrium for all  <   and a unique low-growth equilibrium
for all  >  . Whereas for all     
 
 , both high-growth and low-growth equilibrium coexist17 .
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
8 Conclusion
This research explores the relationship between size of government and economic growth in the presence
of both productive and unproductive capitals. Consistent with the recent empirical work, we model
discount factor as an endogenous function of inherited human capital. High inherited human capital
implies lower discounting of future, which promotes investment in productive human capital returns to
which are realised in future.
We show that with endogenous discounting that depends on inherited human capital, growth outcome
is history dependent. With higher level of inherited human capital, discount rate is low where agents
16For proof, see Appendix C.
17For proof, see Appendix C.
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do not indulge in rent seeking, regardless of the extent of government intervention. In this equilibrium
there is high investment in human capital, no investment in unproductive social capital and there is high
growth rate. Similarly, with low levels of inherited human capital, there is heavy discounting of future
where agents are rent seekers irrespective of the extent of government intervention. In this equilibrium
there is low investment in human capital, high investment in unproductive social capital, and growth
rate is low. With intermediate level of inherited human capital, there is intermediate discounting and
there are multiple equilibria. In this scenario, steady state depends on the size of the government with
bigger size there is low growth equilibrium and with smaller size there is high growth. The thresholds of
inherited human capital that demarcate these di¤erent equilibrium regimes are endogenous and depend
on quality of institutions. Thus countries with identical levels of inherited human capital and the size of
government can be in di¤erent equilibrium regimes if they di¤er in quality of institutions. In all our sub-
specications, better institutions imply lower inherited human capital needed to be in the high-growth
equilibrium.
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